On 9 January 1998, shortly after COP3, the Japanese government confirmed its "provisional policy" for achieving its 6% reduction target as stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol. This June, a cabinet decision was made to confirm this as the "Guideline of Measures to Prevent Global Warming." The numbers seem to add up. However, this "provisional plan" cannot be considered a serious plan to achieve a 6% reduction.

The "provisional policy" states that a total 6% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions will be achieved by a total 2.5% reduction in CO2, methane and nitrous oxide, a 3.7% reduction due to absorption by forests and other sinks, a 1.8% reduction due to emissions trading, joint implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism, and by limiting the increase of CFC-alternatives, etc., to 2%.

It is stated that a total 2.5% reduction of CO2, methane and nitrous oxide is to be achieved. However, as to the contents of this, it is stated that a 0.5% reduction is to be achieved by reduced methane and nitrous oxide emissions and that the remaining 2% will be reduced by "technical innovation and further efforts by all sectors and strata of the nation." "Technical innovation and further efforts by all sectors and strata of the nation" is Japanese bureaucratic jargon implying that "there is no concrete reduction plan."

Though a 3.7% decrease due to absorption by forests and other sinks is anticipated, it is clear from the provisions on sinks in Article 3.3 of the Kyoto Protocol that Japan can only expect absorption of about 0.3%. The figure 3.7% presupposes expansion of sinks due to Article 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol. Furthermore, the plan puts forth no concrete measures for limitation of increases in CFC-alternatives, etc., which is left up to voluntary initiatives.

In addition to adopting the "Guideline of Measures to Prevent Global Warming", the Japanese government also amended a number of laws and determined a number of policies in response to the Kyoto Protocol. However, none of these steps will ensure that Japan complies with its reduction target.

What MITI has done is to revise the “Law Concerning the Rational Use of Energy” and “the Long-Term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook”. We had asserted that prevention of global warming should be specified as an objective of the “Law Concerning the Rational Use of Energy”, but such a provision was not included. The objective of the “Law Concerning the Rational Use of Energy” is stipulated to be energy security. For this reason, the Environment Agency has no involvement with this law. The revisions included an expansion of scope and revised targets, but both are inadequate, and provisions on information disclosure are missing. It is questionable to what extent the law can contribute to greenhouse gas reductions. The revised “Long-Term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook” also assumes increased energy demand based on an exaggerated estimate that the annual GDP growth rate will be 3% until 2000, and 2% from then until 2010 (forecast for 1998 is -1.7%). It takes a passive stance regarding the introduction of renewable energy, which, furthermore, is not considered in terms of greenhouse gas reductions.

In contrast, the Environment Agency responded with “the Law concerning the Promotion of the Measures to Cope with Global Warming”. However, neither is this law stipulated as a law to achieve the reduction target of the Kyoto Protocol, nor does it ensure concrete reductions. The central and local governments' "Global Warming Prevention Plans" have become mandatory, but such plans for industry, which are most crucial, remain merely voluntary.

As the chair of COP3, the Japanese government should take leadership in achieving the reduction targets of the Kyoto Protocol. However, it appears unlikely that the Japanese government will take the leadership that it failed to exhibit during COP3.

Japan Plans 0% Reduction of CO2

Japan's greenhouse gas reduction target is 6%, but the government's reduction plan calls for 0% reduction of CO2, i.e., merely bringing CO2 emissions back to 1990 levels. Even this is stated to be achievable only if maximum measures are taken under the “Law Concerning the Rational Use of Energy”, etc., 21 new nuclear power plants are built, and the ratio of new energy sources to all primary energy sources increases to 3.1% (from the current 1.1%) ("the Long-Term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook", Interim Report of the Energy Supply and Demand Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee for Energy, 11 June 1998). This is because this projection is based on a scenario where the annual economic growth rate is 2% (after 2000) and where energy consumption and CO2 emissions in 2010 increase 30% and 20%, respectively, compared to 1990 levels. This projection is based on the 1994 version of "the Long-Term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook" rather than the results of COP3. It does not differ at all from the reduction target announced by the Japanese government prior to COP3.

Japan's energy policy is known as the "3E Policy”, and has as its supreme objective the simultaneous achievement of energy security, economic growth, and environmental conservation. It takes the position that nuclear power, petroleum and coal are essential for energy security and economic growth, and that nuclear power, which does not cause CO2 emissions, is indispensable for global environmental conservation. A fundamental reform of energy policy and of economic and industrial structures cannot be achieved as long as such conventional policies are firmly maintained.

COP3 confronted us with the fact that the earth cannot survive if the developed countries' current lifestyle and production patterns continue. What are required are new policies and measures that will enable technical innovation, conversion of fuels to renewable energy sources, environmentally appropriate gas co-generation, etc.

It is clear that nuclear power is not a realistic solution. An industrial structure dependent upon petroleum and coal will also eventually lose international competitiveness due to rising costs. Thus, both energy security and economic growth, two of the three "Es”, will be threatened. The third "E”, the environment, will not be safeguarded either, as CO2 emissions will not have been reduced. Business as usual will mean that none of the three "Es" are achieved.

Japan is the only country that has been linking COP3 to the promotion of nuclear power, and is also almost the only country that has not taken COP3 as a signal for transition to natural energy sources such as wind and solar power, or to gas co-generation. The targets for introduction of new energy sources are no different from prior to COP3, and no new policies to promote new energy have been set forth except for some minor increases in subsidies. Though co-generation could increase dramatically with deregulation of the electric power industry, power companies have been very resistant to deregulation. Discussions are nearing conclusion to introduce "partial liberalization”, which in practice will not allow full-scale competition.

However, industry is beginning to make active efforts to reduce CO2 emissions. Sharp has developed various energy-efficient household electrical appliances and has recently brought to market a television with reduced standby power consumption. Seven-Eleven Japan has reduced CO2 emissions by increasing the efficiency of truck deliveries and by installing energy-conserving equipment at all stores. NTT is one of the leading consumers of electric power, but has been the most aggressive in industry to introduce solar and wind power generation. Other plans to establish large-scale wind power generation facilities in Hokkaido and Okinawa have been announced successively this year. District heating by gas co-generation, and other efforts on the local government level are also increasing. If tax incentives and other sound policies to support such efforts are adopted, Japan could become the world's leader in CO2 reduction technologies.

Japan's Ineffective Measures Regarding CFC-Alternatives

CFC-alternatives (HFCs and PFCs), which emerged as substitutes for ozone-depleting CFCs, became subject to emission reductions at COP3 along with SF6. However, the Japanese government's post-COP3 policy in this regard has focused on "voluntary efforts of industry."

HFCs (hydrofluorocarbons) emerged as alternatives to CFCs. Environmental NGOs had called for a halt to use of CFC-alternatives as well as CFCs, pointing out that HFCs are potent greenhouse gases. Nonetheless, many manufacturers using CFCs chose CFC-alternatives such as HCFCs, which destroy the ozone layer, though not as much as CFCs, or HFCs, which are potent greenhouse gases. There are some companies in Japan that first made the transition from CFCs to HCFCs, and have just recently decided to or actually switched over to HFCs. These restrictions are a headache for such companies. The transition from CFCs to HFCs is also beginning in developing countries. Given the need to protect the environment, it would be wise to switch directly to substances that are not liable to be subject to restrictions in the future (e.g., hydrocarbons as refrigerants for refrigeration or air conditioning), rather than converting from CFCs to HFCs.

Voluntary plans by industry focus primarily on collection or prevention of leakage of refrigerants, and other measures to prevent the release of CFCs and CFC-alternatives into the atmosphere. MITI estimates that emissions of HFCs, PFCs, and SF6 in 2010 can be held to a 4% increase from 1995 levels. However, it is easy to regulate these gases as the manufacturer, user, and production amounts can be confirmed. The production of HFCs, which was 2,500 tons in 1992, has dramatically increased to 22,300 tons in 1995 (materials from the Environment Agency and MITI). HFC-134a, which is one of the HFCs produced in massive quantities, has a greenhouse effect 3,300 times that of an equal quantity of carbon dioxide. Furthermore, according to the analysis of the Radioisotope Center of Tokyo University, the atmospheric concentration of CFC-alternatives has increased rapidly during the last few years, especially in the northern hemisphere. Countermeasures based on legal regulation should be actively pursued on the assumption that the production of HFCs is to be totally banned, given their impact on global warming.

While the government has stuck to very conservative measures regarding CFC-alternatives, industry and business have moved one step ahead: Asahi Beer will end the use of CFC-alternatives at its Nagoya factory before the end of 1998, Matsushita Reiki will completely stop the use of CFC-alternatives as insulation material for household refrigerators during this year, and Yokohama Rubber has declared that it will stop the use of CFC-alternatives by 2005.

The proposal which the Japanese government is said to be making, to calculate the amount of CFCs that have been destroyed as a reduction in greenhouse gases under the Kyoto Protocol, is a dangerous loophole that ignores the present critical situation. (The destruction of CFCs is required under the Montreal Protocol anyway.)

Seek a High Figure for Sinks?

The Japanese government has taken the position advocated by MITI that the original gross-net approach (proposed by New Zealand) should be revived through international negotiations for expansion of sinks according to Article 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol, with the expectation that this will allow Japan to count a 3.7% reduction in greenhouse gases due to absorption by domestic forests. The Japanese government chose this figure so that it could keep the 0% reduction target for CO2 emissions which it had set prior to COP3, without having to reinforce current measures or to debate about additional domestic measures.

Will the Figure Stand Up to International Negotiations?

However, when it was pointed out during debate in the Diet that it was unlikely that sinks would be expanded in international negotiations, the Environment Agency admitted in its reply that such an expansion would indeed be difficult.

Later, the Environment Agency and Forestry Agency each held internal meetings to investigate the significance of the agreement on sinks in the Kyoto Protocol, and published reports on their findings. The report of the Forestry Agency, which is the government agency in charge of forest management, sets forth targets for reforestation to absorb 0.3% of greenhouse gas emissions as per Article 3.3 of the Kyoto Protocol, and gives a summary of domestic forestry policy, without ever mentioning the 3.7% figure.

The report of the Environment Agency, which sorts out possible interpretations of the provisions of the Protocol, mentions that reviving the original (New Zealand-proposed) gross-net approach would lead to a major expansion of the vested interests of certain developed countries, which would be enabled to achieve their targets without domestic reduction measures and to amass huge profits from emissions trading. It correctly points out that there is the view that expansion of sinks in Article 3.4 is undesirable from the standpoint of maintaining impartiality.

The gross-net approach proposed by New Zealand was criticized as a loophole by environmental NGOs and rejected by COP3.

Does the Figure Have any Meaning?

The issue of overseas logging activities for Japanese consumption is missing from the above analyses. According to the current IPCC inventory guidelines, such activities are counted as emissions by the country that does the logging. Over the last thirty years, Japan has continued to import massive quantities of timber, in excess of the increase in the growing stock of all domestic forests (i.e., the CO2 absorption by forests). Half of these imports have been for products with short life cycles such as paper and pulp, plywood, etc. Therefore, according to the Atmospheric Flow Method, one of the IPCC's inventory calculation methods, which is due to be revised to account for the impact of trade, it is possible that Japan will be judged as a net emitter of CO2 in the LUCF sector in 1990, in which case Article 3.7 of the Kyoto Protocol would become applicable to Japan. However, the above reports do not evaluate this possibility.

If the handling of logged timber is included in calculations as a result of negotiations on Article 3.4, imported timber will have a major impact similar in scale to that of domestic sinks. The figure 3.7%, which is based only on absorption by domestic forests, is thus an invalid figure. The Japanese government is negotiating for expansion of sinks and attempting to expand loopholes with an invalid figure as its target.

Loopholes for Developed Countries at the Sacrifice of Developing Countries

As chair of the Kyoto Protocol, Japan needs to persuade the USA with debate based on scientific fact in line with the original objectives of the FCCC, rather than cling to a position dictated by the US Congress.

The non-paper on joint implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism which Japan submitted to the FCCC Secretariat in September was presented after thorough coordination with the nine non-EU developed countries (the Umbrella Group). The non-paper opposes any restrictions to tradableemission rights, and states that no further provisions regarding supplementarity are required. Furthermore, it states that necessary provisions for joint implementation such as the baseline calculation method and monitoring guidelines are to be determined only by the concerned countries themselves.

The Japanese government's position regarding the CDM, for which a decision by COP or MOP is required, is that multilateral determination of standards should at first be kept to a minimum, and that the host country should evaluate the contribution of a project to the CDM's stated objective of sustainable development of developing countries. The obligation of developed countries to ensure such contribution is not acknowledged. Ensuring contribution to the environment and sustainable development will be even more difficult for privately-run CDM projects than for ODA. If such projects begin without sound, multilaterally agreed standards, it is even possible that they will be used to lower the reduction costs for developed countries at the sacrifice of the environment of the host country.

Furthermore, bilateral CDM is liable to cause price competition between developing countries trying to attract CDM projects, forcing them to adopt low environmental and social standards. Likewise, placing responsibility just on the host country / seller without adequate standards for monitoring and verification, penalties for non-compliance, etc., will force developing countries to bear all the responsibility for maintaining standards. Incidentally, the government's response to a question from NGOs regarding the additionality of funds for the CDM was that contributions to the CDM would be from the existing ODA budget.

It is clear that not only the issue of the CDM but also that of the participation of developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol as Annex B countries will be brought up at COP4. The Japanese government has indicated that it will strengthen economic cooperation by means of the Kyoto Initiative, etc. Through such means, it has attempted to bring to the surface differences of opinion within the developing block. It should be kept in mind that developing countries have more to lose from participating in the current system of the Kyoto Protocol, which has 1990 as its base year, than they have to gain from short-term funding through the CDM.

Developed countries will be able to purchase cheap reduction options in developing countries via the CDM. During the first commitment period, hot air supplied by such countries as Russia and the Ukraine and credits purchased from overseas via the CDM will become disincentives to domestic measures. If domestic measures are neglected, there will be little progress in reducing developed countries' fossil fuel-based GHG emissions, which account for 2/3 of worldwide fossil fuel-based GHG emissions, and the threat of climate change will continue. New commitments by developing countries, which will be discussed sooner or later, are expected to bring tropical air (resulting from exaggerated estimates of emissions by developing countries) into the market. The issue of hot air trading between developed countries will be succeeded by that of tropical air. By the time investors in developed countries lose interest in developing countries, which will eventually have fewer cheap options to offer, and the emphasis shifts to reduction within the developed countries, ongoing emissions by developed countries will have further exacerbated climate change. Developing countries will then have to cover the high cost of domestic reduction options with their own funds.

This scenario could be changed, and the debate demanded by the USA regarding participation of developing countries could be countered if the developing countries rallied to demand equitable allotment of emission rights based on sustainable greenhouse gas emission levels for the planet as a whole. The resulting redistribution of wealth from the developed countries to the developing countries could greatly change the situation of the debt-ridden developing countries. Participation of individual developing countries in the CDM now, under pressure from developed countries, will seriously compromise the developing countries' power to negotiate with the developed countries for the rights of future generations. Rather than engaging one on one with the developed countries, the developing countries need to rally together to secure future rights.

Will Japan ratify the Kyoto Protocol?

As evident from the above, the reduction commitments of developed countries under the Kyoto Protocol are full of loopholes, and will only slightly delay global warming. There is a need to begin preparations for greater reductions during the second commitment period. Needless to say, this calls for narrowing of the loopholes, prompt entry into force, and full implementation of the Protocol. In particular, as chair of COP3 and as a nation that has allowed its CO2 emissions in 1996 to increase 9.8% compared to 1990 levels, Japan should take the lead in ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, promoting domestic measures, and building momentum for the Protocol to entry into force as soon as possible.

Though Japan takes an official stance in favor of early effectuation of the Kyoto Protocol, it has taken no steps whatsoever to promptly ratify it.

“The Law Concerning the Promotion of the Measures to Cope with Global Warming” was adopted on October 2nd, 1998. However, according to the government and the Environment Agency, this is not a law to achieve the 6% reduction target committed to under the Kyoto Protocol, but merely provides a foundation for this. MITI's “Law Concerning the Rational Use of Energy” was amended in June, but on the premise that CO2 emissions would be stabilized at 1990 levels on the condition that 20 nuclear power plants are newly established.

In international negotiations after COP3, the Japanese government has been at the forefront of efforts to weaken in real terms the numerical targets committed to under the Kyoto Protocol, by announcing its policy to work for expansion of sinks, calling for inclusion of projects started prior to 2000 in the Clean Development Mechanism, approving of trading of credits gained, and maneuvering to establish the Russian Bubble for Russian hot air.

Japan is currently in a serious economic deflation. The government is hoping for recovery of the Japanese economy through growth of GDP with increased energy consumption, as in the past. However, what Japan needs to do is to convert its socioeconomic structures to establish a sustainable society and economy. It is essential that public funds and human resources be invested in technical innovation for energy conservation in harmony with nature, and in expansion of renewable energy supplies. To this end, it is necessary to begin by building a system to work out and promote truly effective countermeasures to global warming on the basis of heightened transparency and citizens' participation.